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AN FSOC FOR CONTINUOUS PUBLIC 
INVESTMENT: THE NATIONAL 




The crisis our nation presently faces does not stem from COVID-19 alone. 
That was the match. The kindling was that we have forgotten for decades that 
“national development” both (a) is perpetual, and (b) requires national action 
to guide it, facilitate it, and keep it inclusive.
Hamilton and Gallatin, Wilson and Hoover and Roosevelt all understood 
this and built institutions to operationalize it. Although the institutions were 
imperfectly operated, they were soundly conceived and designed. Abandoning 
these truths and institutions these past fifty years has degenerated not only our 
public health, but also our nation’s industrial and infrastructural muscle to a 
critical point. The same now increasingly holds for our social fabric.
Full national regeneration—Reconstruction in both the post-Civil War 
and the mid-20th century senses of the word—has thus become a matter of 
urgent, even existential, necessity. Continuous national development, in the 
perpetual renewal sense of the phrase, must follow that Reconstruction. This 
is what “Building Back Better” must mean. Key to any such national project 
is how it is organized and then orchestrated.
This paper proposes means of both organizing and orchestrating. These 
means are simultaneously incrementalist in their reliance upon existing 
institutions, while also regenerative in enabling new synergies among those 
same institutions—much as our Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) 
is meant to enable our post-Lehman financial regulators to develop. An FSOC 
for national reconstruction and development will better use what we already 
have and augment it with a financing arm linked to the Federal Reserve and
the Treasury.
I call the resulting synthesis a National Reconstruction and Development 
Council (NRDC) and National Investment Council (NIC), which will both 
rebuild capacity now, and perpetually renew such capacity going forward, as 
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Finance, Georgetown McDonough School of Business; Senior Counsel, Westwood Capital, LLC; 
Advisory Board, Public Banking Institute; Advisory Board, Stanford Digital Currency Lab; Found-
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knowledge and technology progress as they always do. Building Back Better 
means Building Back Now and Forever.
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I. INTRODUCTION: RECONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
In the midst of the present pandemic, it is not controversial to suggest that 
the US could do with a tonic or shot in the arm. But it needs more than that—
something more long-term, and something that we used to have.
Our nation stands now in dire need of both a coherent national development 
strategy and the institutional means of formulating and executing such a strate-
gy. We require, in other words, a contemporary analogue to our earlier Hamil-
tonian Bank of the United States and Reconstruction Finance Corporation—or, 
what comes to much the same, an American rendition of Japan’s vaunted Minis-
try of Trade and Industry (MITI) or J.M. Keynes’s proposed Board of National 
Investment (BNI), both of which were patterned on prior American models.1
The longer we wait to address these needs, the more fitting the observation that 
we need these things not merely for national development, but for national re-
construction and development.
1. More on these institutions below. See ROBERT C. HOCKETT, FINANCING THE GREEN
NEW DEAL: A PLAN OF ACTION AND RENEWAL 37–41 (2020) [hereinafter FINANCING THE GREEN 
NEW DEAL] (noting the similarities between a National Investment Council and the Bank of the 
United States and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation); see also Hockett, Spread the Fed: Dis-
tributed Central Banking in Pandemic and Beyond, infra note 62; Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian 
Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in the Design of a Comprehen-
sive and Contemporary American “Ownership Society”, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2006) (noting that 
member institutions were capitalized by invested federal funds that were later converted into capital 
subscriptions of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation).
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Reconstruction and development—these two words independently, along 
with the phrase that conjoining them yields, should ring familiar. The period of 
national healing, rebuilding, and renewal on which we embarked after our mid-
19th century Civil War—a rebuilding we never completed and now must re-
sume—is of course known as “the Reconstruction.”2 The public financial insti-
tution that Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt established and employed to re-
build and mobilize during the Great Depression and Second World War eras, in 
turn, were called “the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.”3 And the global 
financial institution that the US did more than any other nation to establish after 
the Second World War, both to reconstruct Europe and to develop the rest of the 
world, still operates under the name of “the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development”—better known as the World Bank.4
As these institutional monikers suggest, we have typically used the words 
“reconstruction” and “development” during or after periods of cataclysm or 
revolutionary change. Against such a backdrop, it is hardly surprising that we 
don’t use the same words in describing our needs in more ordinary times.5 We 
have after all been developed, at least on orthodox development economists’
understanding of the word, for well over a century. And our last national cata-
clysm conceded by all to necessitate reconstruction—the Great Depression—is 
now nearly eighty years past.
But this terminological quirk, it turns out, has both manifested and perpetu-
ated a costly strategic mistake. Productive practices and technologies do not 
simply switch on and then rest in stasis thereafter. No, they continuously de-
velop and so must we. I say “we” here, moreover, deliberately. It is we, in our 
collective national capacity, acting through institutional forms of collective 
agency, who must plan, oversee, and coordinate our own national develop-
2. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, The U.S. Needs To Complete Its Reconstruction Efforts. 
Here’s How., FORBES (June 7, 2020, 1:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/06/07
/reconstruction-10/#3149e9307e40.
3. See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 1, at 28; Robert Hockett, Public-
Private Partnering in Crisis and Beyond: Why Now for a National Investment Authority, a National 
Investment Council, or a Health Finance Corporation, 65 CHALLENGE (forthcoming 2020); Robert 
C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Invest-
ment Authority, 43 J. CORP. L. 101 (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2939309; Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, White Paper: A National Investment Authori-
ty (Cornell Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 18-10, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3125533; Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, ‘Public’ Actors in 
‘Private’ Markets: Toward a Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 112 (2015).
4. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: An Essay in Constructive Retrieval, 16 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y, 401, 415 (2013); Robert Hockett, For a Global Shareholder Socie-
ty, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 101 (2008); Robert Hockett, Three (Potential) Pillars of Transna-
tional Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as Guarantors of Global Equal Treatment 
and Market Completion, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 93, 111 (2005).
5. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, NO ORDINARY TIME: FRANKLIN AND ELEANOR 
ROOSEVELT: THE HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II (1994), for an illuminating and inspiring medita-
tion on ordinary versus extraordinary times, with particular attention to the New Deal and Second 
World War eras.
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ment.6 And after both decades of not doing this on the one hand, and two con-
sequent calamities traceable to our not having done so on the other, this means 
planning, overseeing, and coordinating our own reconstruction—our own na-
tional “Building Back Better”—as well.7
This paper shows how to do this: how to rebuild, reconstruct, renew, and 
never grow backward again. How to Build Back Better, in Joe Biden’s words.
It shows how to complete our incomplete Reconstruction of the post-Civil War 
Era, to retrieve lessons lost after the New Deal and Second World War, and in 
so doing return to redeeming our national promise and never be underdeveloped 
or atavistic again.
Key to any project of such scale and scope is its organization. Any mode of 
such organization is, in a sense, simply the form or the structure of a practice or 
institution—the shared “how” to a shared “what.”8 This paper also accordingly 
sets out a mode of such organizing, and hence an institution, well suited to the 
task of restoring, revitalizing, and henceforth maintaining the American econo-
my after some fifty years of devolution and twelve years of outright crisis.
I call the resultant institution a National Reconstruction and Development 
Council (NRDC), which amounts to a functional synthesis of existing federal 
instrumentalities. The NRDC is supplemented by a financing arm, what I call 
an NRDC Investment Committee and coequal National Investment Council 
(NIC),9 which are functionally situated between our Federal Reserve (the 
6. The nature and need of collective agency figure prominently below and in much more of 
the present author’s work. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The 
Structure of Procyclicality in Financial and Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies and Formally 
Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Recursive Collective Action Problems];
Robert Hockett, Rousseauvian Money (Cornell L. Sch. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series No. 18-48, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=3278408; FINANCING THE GREEN NEW 
DEAL, supra note 1; Robert Hockett & Rhiana Gunn-Wright, The Green New Deal: Mobilizing for 
a Just, Prosperous, and Sustainable Economy (Cornell L. Stud. Res. Paper Series No. 19-09, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=3342494 [hereinafter The Green New Deal];
Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 (2010).
7. See Hockett, supra note 2. It bears noting that such a project resonates well with Vice 
President Biden’s catchy call for the nation to “Build Back Better.” See also Joe’s Vision, JOE 
BIDEN, https://joebiden.com/joes-vision/# (last visited November 8, 2020).
8. See generally Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 6 (noting the form of 
“sharing” envisaged here).
9. A separate NIC arm, as distinguished from an in-house Investment Committee, of the 
NRDC would, thanks to a shared designer, bear several similarities to the National Investment Au-
thority (NIA) that Professor Omarova and I developed six years ago and have been advocating ever 
since. There is enough similarity, at any rate, to underwrite the present author’s hope that any such 
instrumentality would include my earlier co-author on its founding board. I nevertheless think now, 
however, that it is a mistake to think in terms of an investment institution alone when thinking about 
making a permanent practice of nationally developing and executing a national development policy.
A better model pairs an FSOC-reminiscent planning board with an RFC-reminiscent financing arm, 
much as President Roosevelt paired a War Production Board with the RFC during the 1940s, and as 
President Wilson paired a War Industries Board with a War Finance Corporation (‘WFC’)—the 
RFC’s predecessor—during the First World War. For more on these pairings and their significance, 
see HOCKETT, FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 1; Hockett, Public-Private Partnering 
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“Fed”) and our Treasury thanks in part to its unavoidably combining aspects of 
both allocative fiscal and aggregative monetary policy.10
Instead of simply replacing existing national institutions, which are them-
selves forms of organization and hence collective agencies meant to achieve na-
tional goals, the NRDC organizes the organizations, recognizing in so doing 
that the task of national reconstruction and development is a perpetual meta-
project subsuming most if not all of the narrower mandates of existing federal 
instrumentalities. It is a means of both ensuring coherence and capitalizing on 
synergies among agencies that on the one hand already have well defined mis-
sions, but on the other hand also have what are now separate missions that 
henceforth will be synchronized.
In this sense, the NRDC can be likened to the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC), for both national reconstruction now and continuous national 
development ever after.11 Like the FSOC, it will use and optimize existing 
in Times of Crisis and Beyond, supra note 3; Robert Hockett, Opinion, The U.S. Must Take Equity 
Stakes in the Companies It Rescues, FIN. TIMES, (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.ft.com
/content/86a333d0-6dc3-11ea-89df-41bea055720b; Robert Hockett, The U.S. Needs to Tackle the 
Coronavirus Pandemic with a Playbook out of the Great Depression and World War II, not the Fi-
nancial Crisis, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 29, 2020, 9:42 AM), https://www.business insid-
er.com/coronavirus-pandemic-us-should-ramp-up-ventilator-mask-manufacturing-2020-3; Robert 
Hockett, We’re at War and Need Wartime Institutions to Keep Our Economy Producing What’s
Necessary, THE HILL (April 4, 2020, 2:00PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/491166-
were-at-war-and-need-wartime-institutions-to-keep-our-economy-producing.
10. The distinction between and relations among what the author calls “credit-aggregative”
or “-modulatory” policy on the one hand and “credit-allocative” policy on the other hand are fun-
damental to this author’s work of the past twelve years, and failure to attend carefully to their rela-
tions accounts for a surprisingly large portion of the most salient financial and macroeconomic dis-
asters of the past century. See generally Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 6 
(introducing the distinction and proposing “regulation as modulation” as preferred model of finan-
cial supervision); Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and 
Soundness’ to Systemic ‘Financial Stability’ in Financial Supervision, 9. U. VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 
(2015) [hereinafter Macroprudential Turn] (interpreting the move toward macroprudential finance 
oversight as reflecting long-awaited implicit recognition of the distinction’s regulatory importance); 
Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 6 (uncovering and explicating the struc-
ture of joint and several action that produces the distinction); Hockett, Rousseauvian Money, supra
note 6 (uncovering and explicating the structure of joint and several action that produces the distinc-
tion); HOCKETT, FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 1 (developing a full GND finance 
plan that studiously hews to the distinction and the practical challenges it raises). For a searching 
analysis of the practical inseparability of the conceptually distinct allocation and modulation func-
tions, and of the consequences of this inseparability for the sustainability of our present practice of 
assigning allocation to Treasury and modulation to the Federal Reserve, see generally Robert Hock-
ett, The Capital Commons: Digital Money and Citizen Central Banking in a Commercial Republic,
39 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 345 (2019–2020). See also Robert Hockett, Money in Context, Part 1,
LAW & POLITICAL ECONOMY PROJECT (Apr. 9, 2020), https://lpeproject.org/blog/money-in-context-
part-1/ (discussing the conceptual distinction and the practical difficulty of maintaining it); Robert 
Hockett, Money in Context, Part 2, LAW & POLITICAL ECONOMY PROJECT (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://lpeproject.org/blog/money-in-context-part-2/.
11. See Robert C. Hockett, Oversight of the Financial Stability Oversight Council: Due Pro-
cess and Transparency in Non-Bank SIFI Designations 1 (Cornell Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series No. 
16–20, 2015); see also Hockett, Macroprudential Turn, supra note 10.
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agencies’ strengths by coordinating their use and assuring finance at the same 
time. It will, again, like the FSOC, add on or superimpose a new “coordinating 
layer” over existing layers, thereby satisfying Occam’s Razor in tweaking no 
more, but also no less, than must be to once-again meet recognized national 
needs.12
The paper continues as follows: Section II first provides a brief reminder of 
why national reconstruction and development require concerted national action,
rather than being left to households, business firms, or even sub-federal levels 
of government acting on their own in uncoordinated fashion. It also notes vari-
ous forms that such agency can take, including forms that the present author has 
developed in the past.  Thereafter, it turns to elaborating the form and opera-
tional details of the NRDC itself and assessing a menu of structural options in 
so doing. Section III then proposes next steps for establishment of the NRDC, 
NIC, and possible regional branches.
II. A NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
While the desirability of national reconstruction and development in the ab-
stract might be obvious, the reasons for making a national policy of these things 
might at first appear less so. The same goes, a fortiori, for any national institu-
tion or instrumentality charged with crafting and executing a national recon-
struction and development policy. This section accordingly briefly rehearses 
the mentioned reasons, then details an institution made to order in response to 
them.
A. National Development and National Agency
As noted above, the present author has been advocating and provisionally 
designing development institutions—means of collective agency in the cause of 
perpetual national and transnational development—for a decade now.13 The 
present proposal simply applies the design principles that shaped the earlier 
proposals, while reflecting the general reasons that prompted them.  It differs 
from those earlier proposals only in attending to the most salient attributes of 
the present predicament of the US in particular.
12. See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 1; see also Section III infra. The au-
thor has drafted legislation to similar effect that is now before the State Assembly and Senate of the 
State of New York. See S.B. S8459, 2020 Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020); see also Robert C. 
Hockett, What to Make of Community QE: Look Now to New York, FORBES (May 24, 2020, 2:00 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/05/24/what-now-to-make-of-community-qelook-
to-new-york/#14ce8beee466.
13. See, e.g., Robert C. Hockett, The Nation Building Here at Home Act of 2012 (Cornell 
Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series No. 12–10, 2012); ROBERT C. HOCKETT, ET AL., THE WAY FORWARD
(New America, 2011); Robert C. Hockett & Robert H. Frank, Public Investment, Renewed Growth, 
and the US Fiscal Position (Cornell Legal Res. Stud. Paper Series No. 2–04, 2012).
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The considerations that first prompted the present author’s proposing and 
continuing to recommend a national development institution are several. First 
and foundationally, as noted above, our polity fell into grave error when it be-
gan treating national development as a done deal or one-off affair, something 
that nations do once and for all in transitioning from underdeveloped to devel-
oped status and then never take up again. This assumption is clearly erroneous 
because development is always implicitly understood in relation to a time-dated 
technological state of the art on the one hand, and that technology itself stand-
ing still on the other hand. Just as knowledge and technical capacities develop 
perpetually, so must nations and their economies.
Then it follows that whatever considerations prompted our own and other 
nations to make concerted national projects of development in the past likely 
also warrant our making a coherent national project of national development 
now, in the present—indeed in every present.14 As it happens, such considera-
tions are neither hard to find nor difficult to recognize. They are just as compel-
ling today as they were in our nation’s more distant and more recent past. All 
of them, moreover, are rooted in familiar coordination and collective action 
challenges, meaning that one need not even be economically heterodox to ap-
preciate the necessity of collective agency in addressing and solving them.15
Market failures that they are, markets can’t fix them. Only we can do that. Ex-
amples are readily adduced, particularly in the realms of industrial and infra-
structure policy.
Where productive industry is concerned, individual households and firms 
are unable to control the background conditions, such as full employment in 
high quality occupations, steady effective demand, or secular price stability, 
which are requisite to long-term investment profitability.16 Hence they will of-
ten find it individually rational to bet on price movements in secondary finan-
cial and tertiary derivatives markets rather than invest ‘patient capital’ in pro-
jects that take longer to materialize.17 But such individually rational decisions 
aggregate into collectively irrational outcomes—in particular, underinvestment, 
underdevelopment, and over-speculation. In this sense they account for our 
14. Notably Germany, Japan, the “Tiger Economies” and modern China. See, e.g., Hockett 
& Omarova, Private Actors in Private Markets, supra note 3.
15. See Hockett, supra notes 1, 6 (sources and associated text).
16. See id.; see also Hockett, The Capital Commons, supra note 10; Robert Hockett, Fi-
nance without Financiers, 47 POL. & SOC’Y 491 (2019); cf. Robert Hockett & Saule Omarova, The 
Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017). On ‘high quality’ employment, which has 
been steadily dwindling in the US for fifty years even when official ‘unemployment’ was low, see
Daniel Alpert, et al., The US Private Sector Job Quality Index (Cornell Legal Stud. Res. Paper Se-
ries No. 20–33, 2019) (developing and applying a practical measure of ‘job quality’ and demonstrat-
ing steady decline since the early 1970s).
17. The importance of this explanation of ‘financialization’ and associated macroeconomic 
dysfunction cannot be overstated yet appears to be entirely overlooked. Private capital cannot find 
yield in contemporary primary markets. Hence quite rationally speculates on movements in securi-
ties prices and secondary market indices, often through taking derivative positions. See Hockett, 
Finance without Financiers, supra note 16.
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economy’s dysfunctional and counterproductive ‘financialization’ of the past 
fifty years.18
Meanwhile, where infrastructure is concerned, the gains to national income 
to be had from state-of-the-art infrastructure are generally diffuse and individu-
ally uncapturable, and manifest over long time horizons exceeding individual 
human lifespans.19 This means they are difficult for individual investors to cap-
ture and profit by. Thus, it can again be individually rational for private sector 
agents to underinvest in productivity-enhancing infrastructure, a classic public 
good, while engaging in over-speculation.20 Hence again, individually rational 
decisions to refrain from investing will aggregate into collectively irrational un-
derinvestment on the part of the polity as a whole. Crumbling infrastructure is 
but one conspicuous consequence.21
The foregoing are reasons for collective agency and government action.
But why national planning by a single national development institution?
Here, the answer is that national development in any complex economy or 
geographically extended political unit, especially an economy and polity as 
complex as our own, cannot but implicate multiple industries, multiple firms, 
multiple sectors, multiple regions, multiple states, multiple cities, and of course 
multiple households and communities. This means, in turn, that any develop-
ment policy that is truly comprehensive and national in scope will be vulnerable 
to counterproductive operational inconsistencies and inefficient operational 
overlaps. At least that is so unless actions are planned and executed coherently, 
as if by one collective agent—that is, a government or instrumentality of gov-
ernment. It also means that no level of collective agency short of our national
government will be fully up to the task.
This is not to say that state and local levels of government or private sector 
households and firms are not themselves critically necessary agents in national 
development, any more than saying an orchestra needs a conductor is saying it 
doesn’t need violinists and cellists. It is only to say that the task of comprehen-
sive coordination and mobilization is the task of the most inclusive and least fi-
nancially constrained level of governance. The same goes for the matter of de-
velopment finance. For federal republics like our own, only the national 
government is monetarily and hence financially autonomous; cities and states 
are not.22
The consequences of our having forgotten or overlooked these simple truths 
are all around us. To fly into an airport, drive on a highway, or take a train in 
near any other developed country right now is to marvel at how backward we in 
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the U.S. have become.23 To visit a bank branch, ATM, or post office in one of 
these countries, in turn, is to wonder why the nation that hosts the financial cap-
ital of the world—Lower Manhattan—is as monetarily backward as it is, with
fully one quarter of its population unbanked or underbanked.24 And of course 
to grocery-shop or to dine, or to seek non-emergency medical attention in any 
of these countries is to wonder why Americans are the only developed country 
citizens in the world to be as malnourished and chronically ill as we are, a con-
dition that partly accounts for our greater morbidity during the COVID-19 pan-
demic than that of our peer nations.25
The foregoing are of course longstanding deficiencies of American national 
development and one could have cited them easily 30 to 50 years back. But 
now, as noted in introducing this paper, we face reconstruction and rebuilding 
challenges too. This is partly because we have been falling developmentally 
behind for so long, but it is also because we have suffered two national calami-
ties in just over a decade, all while global climate conditions now hurtle toward 
mass-catastrophe.
The crash of 2008 and its debt-deflationary aftermath, for example, not only 
destroyed many trillions of dollars of accumulated American wealth, but also 
set the national economy on a slower growth path that it has yet to outgrow.26
In so doing it simply destroyed, without replacing, millions of small banks, 
small businesses, and well-paying construction and manufacturing job opportu-
nities.27 As if that were not trouble enough, the current pandemic has, within 
months, killed far more Americans than did nearly all of our past wars com-
23. Id. Indeed in some cases we are behind nations that we ourselves occupied and rebuilt.
See Hockett, The Nation-Building Here at Home Act, supra note 13.
24. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Digital Greenbacks: A Sequenced ‘TreasuryDirect’ and 
‘FedWallet’ Plan for The Democratic Digital Dollar, 18 J. L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3599419; Robert Hockett, The Democratic 
Digital Dollar: A Peer-to-Peer Savings and Payments Platform for Inclusive State, Local, and Na-
tional Money and Banking Systems, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2020); ROBERT HOCKETT, THE
INCLUSIVE VALUE LEDGER: DIGITAL DOLLARS AND DIGITAL PLATFORMS FOR DIGITAL PUBLIC 
BANKING (The Justice Collaborative Institute & Data for Progress 2020), https://tjcinstitute.com
/research/the-inclusive-value-ledger-digital-dollars-and-digital-platforms-for-digital-public-
banking/; Robert Hockett & Lawrence Rufrano, Digital Dollars for All, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 6, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/digital-dollars-for-all-11586215100.
25. See, e.g., Abdulzahra Hussain et al., Obesity and Mortality of Covid-19: Meta-Analysis, 
14 OBESITY RSCH. & CLINICAL PRAC. 295 (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles
/PMC7346803/; Fabian Sanchis-Gomar et al, Obesity and Outcomes in Covid-19: When an Epidem-
ic and a Pandemic Collide, MAYO CLINIC PROC. (SPECIAL ARTICLE) 1445 (2020), 
https://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(20)30477-8/fulltext; Tanya Albert Hen-
ry, Data from 10 Cities Show Covid Impact Based on Poverty, Race, AMA (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/health-equity/data-10-cities-show-covid-19-impact-
based-poverty-race.
26. See Robert Hockett, Ten Years On: What Have We Learned? What Have We Done? 
What Must We Do?, 63 CHALLENGE 31, 35–36, 42–43 (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3298833.
27. Id.
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bined: all while shattering every past record, including those previously set by 
the Great Depression, where lost lives, lost wealth, lost enterprises, and lost 
gainful employment are concerned.28
Add to this climate change. As has been widely discussed since last year, 
especially in connection with the Green New Deal that this author helped to de-
velop, the world is now approaching a tipping point—a point of no return.29
Climate scientists have determined that there is no more than a decade to pre-
vent an irreversible and catastrophic climatic tipping point, beyond which nei-
ther our own nor many other species can be assumed likely to survive.30
On the way to that dark ending, extreme socio-economic injustice and asso-
ciated political breakdown can be expected to hasten as well. Such injustice is 
now well underway in nations already hard-hit by environmental crisis, as well 
as in bordering nations toward which literally millions of climate refugees are 
mass-migrating.  Indeed, if recent police-prompted racial unrest in the U.S. is 
any indication, that hastening is already happening. Environmental disaster and 
associated social, economic, and political dysfunction, in consequence, could 
ironically come to stand in the way of collectively addressing the processes 
driving these breakdowns in the first place. Clearly, we are urgently due for na-
tional reconstruction and development alike.
The NRDC sketched below is meant simply to give institutional expression 
to that form of collective agency which the foregoing “parade of horribles” ne-
cessitates. It aims to do so in a way that makes maximal use of modalities and 
institutions we already have, supplementing and reconfiguring them just 
enough, but no more than is needed, to do what needs doing. Hence, instead of 
constituting an entirely new entity and associated bureaucracy from scratch, the 
NRDC will combine existing cabinet-level federal agencies in a more produc-
tive arrangement than is presently found. It will amount, in other words, to a 
synergistic partial re-combining of instrumentalities we already have, to enable 
them to act collectively in addressing that massive collective action challenge 
which is our project of national reconstruction and development.
Inasmuch as the Council takes existing instrumentalities as it finds them, 
simply facilitating and optimizing their necessary collaboration, it is in one 
sense a merely incremental reform. In another sense, however, its promise is 
far reaching indeed. For it turns out that a truly remarkable number of contem-
porary dysfunctions, recognized by Americans of all political stripes, are at-
tributable to remarkably poor organization. In that sense, the present proposal 
can be viewed as a contribution as much to Applied Organization Theory as to 
28. See Covid Hospitalizations and Deaths by Age, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Aug. 22, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigations-discovery
/hospitalization-death-by-age.html.
29. See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 1; The Green New Deal, supra note 
6.
30. See generally 2 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE 
ASSESSMENT (2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_Report-in-Brief.pdf.
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our nation as we presently find it—immeasurably blessed, immensely re-
sourced, but remarkably poorly constructed for purposes of contemporary re-
construction and development. On, then, to the design.
B. A National Reconstruction and Development Council
As noted above, the project of national reconstruction and development will 
implicate many distinct industries across our economy and multiple levels of 
government, not to mention both public and private sectors.  The Green New 
Deal, to take one example, encompasses fully fourteen project fields. No seri-
ous national reconstruction project is likely to implicate fewer. We can accord-
ingly use the terms Green New Deal (GND), Building Back Better (3B), and 
National Reconstruction and Development (NRD) more or less interchangeably 
in what follows.
In order to ensure optimal coordination among (a) multiple 3B, GND, or 
NRD project fields, (b) the multiple levels and units of government involved in 
realizing the redevelopment project, and (c) the public and private sector enti-
ties also involved in realizing that project, it will be necessary to establish a co-
ordinative body charged with the task of overseeing and facilitating the pro-
ject’s many activities. That body will be the NRDC. It is in view of its 
structural similarities to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), 
which aggregates information for and coordinates efforts among the nation’s
multiple finance-regulatory agencies, that I suggest we call this new institution 
a National Reconstruction and Development Council (again, NRDC, or just 
“Council”).31
The NRDC will be charged with the task of developing and executing, first 
(a) a comprehensive yet coherent national pandemic response, then (b) a like-
wise comprehensive and inclusive but also coherent infrastructural reconstruc-
tion, and finally (c) an ongoing and continually updated national development 
policy. Let us formally recognize that a national development policy is every 
bit as essential as national defense policy, national economic policy, national 
environmental policy, and so on. Indeed, the first is prerequisite to all others.
In light of this mission, the Council should comprise the heads of the Fed, 
the Treasury, and all cabinet-level and other relevant Executive Agencies with 
jurisdiction over national industry and infrastructure, including the Department 
of Energy (DOE), the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Department 
of Education (DE), the Department of Labor (DOL), the Equal Employment 
31. For more on the FSOC, its animating considerations and ongoing functions, see Hockett, 
Macroprudential Turn, supra note 10. See also Oversight of the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council: Due Process and Transparency in Non-Bank SIFI Designations: Hearing Before Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. (2015) (state-
ment of Robert Hocket, Professor, Cornell University); Hocket, supra note 12 (the New York State 
institution designed by the author and now under consideration by the State Legislature).
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Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), and so on. These persons will be charged with formulating long-term 
national development strategies within each of their respective jurisdictional 
mandates, and then synthesizing them into a single coherent and non-
duplicative whole.
The NRDC will effectively constitute a contemporary analogue to both (a) 
the War Industries Board (WIB) and War Finance Corporation (WFC) pairing 
that oversaw and coordinated our national mobilization effort during the First 
World War, and (b) the War Production Board (WPB) and Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation (RFC) pairing that oversaw and coordinated first the New 
Deal, then the Second World War mobilization efforts.32 It will also continue to 
bear similarities to the First Bank of the United States, designed by the nation’s
first Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, to coordinate and facilitate our 
then-new nation’s financial and economic development.33 And it will do so 
with a “regulatory college” structure of the kind seen in the FSOC.34
We can begin a more detailed treatment with more on the NRDC’s func-
tions and level of government, then flesh out its structure.
1. Role and Functions, ‘Level’ of Government
After post-COVID-19 Reconstruction, the NRDC will bear primary respon-
sibility for developing and pursuing national industrial and infrastructural re-
newal at the federal level. It will not view or treat this as a mere exigency, im-
portant for now but not later. To the contrary, like MITI in Japan to this day 
and its multiple American exemplars in days past, it will treat our coherent and 
inclusive development as permanent tasks, continuing for as long as both theo-
retical and applied knowledge advance.
As noted above, this cannot but involve planning and coordinating in col-
laboration with other federal agencies, other levels of government, and the pri-
vate sector, just as was done by Hamilton’s First Bank of the U.S., the 
WIB/WFC pairing, and the WPB/RFC pairing during earlier periods of our his-
tory.35 The Council will also coordinate and, in many cases, secure or provide 
32. See HOCKETT, FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 1; GOODWIN, supra note 
5.
33. See supra text accompanying note 32. These histories are fully elaborated in FORREST
MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1979); Robert Hockett, Pre-Liberal Autonomy and Post-
Liberal Finance, 77 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2015); JAMES STUART OLSON, SAVING 
CAPITALISM: THE RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION AND THE NEW DEAL—1933–1940
(1988); JESSE H. JONES, FIFTY BILLION DOLLARS: MY THIRTEEN YEARS WITH THE RFC (1932–
1945) (1951).
34. For more on this model generically considered, see Hockett, Macroprudential Turn, su-
pra note 10; see also Robert Hockett, Implementing Macroprudential Finance-Oversight: Legal 
Considerations, IMF (2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2340316.
35. FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 1; see also supra text accompanying note 
5.
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funding for the many projects that will make up the national reconstruction and 
continuous development efforts: again, as both Hamilton’s Bank and those pair-
ings did.36 This it can do partly with Congressionally appropriated funds and 
partly with bond issuances as well as, going forward, returns on its own invest-
ments managed by its own investment arm, again as was done by its predeces-
sors.37
Where securing or providing funding is concerned, the Council will have 
multiple options. It can lend directly to, or purchase equity stakes in or bonds 
issued by, targeted entities or enterprises.38 It can also do so for syndicates of 
financiers, including private sector ones, that it itself forms.39 Or it can recom-
mend Fed purchases of such issuances.40
As for its own funding, at the front end this can come through either or both 
Congressional appropriations and bond sales of its own. The latter in turn can 
include general purpose instruments, sector-specific instruments, and even pro-
ject-specific instruments. Going the latter route can enable the Council in effect 
to employ markets’ price discovery mechanisms to acquire preliminary infor-
mation as to the likely success or otherwise of particular contemplated pro-
jects.41 Going forward, as NRDC investments begin yielding returns as did 
Bank of the U.S., WFC and RFC investments in their eras, the NRDC can plow 
those returns into further investments, generating a longer-term positive feed-
back or snowball effect.42
The Council will work closely with the private sector in the grand project of 
rebuilding the national economy, and this in turn will involve bringing together 
the operations of many now-diffuse federal instrumentalities, many of which 
used to operate within one structure in the past, when they were themselves 
RFC subsidiaries.43 It is easy to imagine the potential for thereby establishing a 
more seamlessly integrated network of public-private venture capital and small 
business financing operations. Multiple federal venture capital funds and other 
agencies and programs targeting innovative start-ups, such as the Telecommu-
nications Development Fund (TDF)44 and the aforementioned Small Business 
36. Id.





42. FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 1, at 40; see generally GOODWIN, supra
note 5.
43. Id.
44. TDF is a federal venture capital fund created in 1996 for the general purpose of financ-
ing small businesses developing telecommunications technologies. 47 U.S.C. § 614. TDF’s strategy 
focuses on equity investments in telecommunications start-ups. See also S. Jenell Trigg, Telecom-
munications Development Fund: Making a Difference? THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, https://web.archive.org/web/20160518033343/http:/www. civilrights.org
/publications/1996_telecommunications/section-714.html.
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Administration (SBA),45 can be organizationally incorporated into the NRDC 
structure just as they previously were in the RFC structure.
As suggested above, the Council will also work in particularly close collab-
oration with the Fed, the Department of the Treasury, and the specific cabinet-
level departments of the federal government whose mandates embrace specific 
national reconstruction and development project fields. The reason for close 
collaboration with Fed and Treasury is that the NRDC’s financial and fiscal op-
erations will be adjacent to—and indeed operationally situated between and un-
avoidably interactive with—those of these two entities, respectively, and hence 
must be conducted in harmony with them. The reason for close collaboration 
with other cabinet level units of federal governance, in turn, is that the National 
Reconstruction and then Development project fields in many cases fall within 
the functional mandates of the corresponding Departments—much as particular 
pieces of the First World War, New Deal, and Second World War mobilizations 
did before them.46
The 3B’s, GND’s, or NRD’s efforts in the realm of transport infrastructure, 
for example, will be many. Our roads, rails, airports and the like are a global 
embarrassment. Restoring, augmenting, replacing, or upgrading them will im-
plicate both the work and the expertise of the Department of Transportation
(DOT). Massive efforts in the realm of energy infrastructures likewise will be 
necessary. We already have the capacity to retrofit literally tens of millions of 
American homes, business premises, and other buildings with solar panels, 
heat-trapping windows, and other technologies of building efficiency improve-
ment—we invented these technologies and can employ literally millions of 
Americans in their manufacture, installation, and export. This will of course 
implicate the work and expertise of the Department of Energy (DOE), the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Export-Import Bank 
(Ex-Im Bank), and a host of other cabinet-level agencies.
NRD, 3B, or GND efforts in the realm of pollution abatement and environ-
mental cleanup, in turn, will implicate the work of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Department of the Interior (DOI), while the administra-
tion of any 3B, GND or NRD job retraining, job-guaranteeing, or other em-
ployment programs will implicate the work of the Department of Labor (DOL), 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC). As the 3B, GND, or NRDC works to facilitate 
the establishment and mass proliferation economy-wide of new startup compa-
nies all across the private sector, meanwhile, they will implicate the work of the 
45. SBA was established in 1953 to facilitate small business formation and growth via the 
so-called “three Cs” of capital, contracting, and counseling. See About SBA, U.S. SMALL BUS.
ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/category/navigation-structure/about-sba (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
46. See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 1, at 40–41.
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aforementioned TDF and SBA.47 And mass upgrading and expansion of our 
institutions of advanced research and higher learning, vocational and polytech-
nical education, and even ‘Head Start,’ kindergarten, primary and secondary 
education will of course implicate the jurisdiction and expertise of the Depart-
ment of Education.
In all of these and countless other 3B, GND, or NRD projects far to numer-
ous even to begin to catalogue here, which will bring redevelopment and untold 
prosperity to hundreds of millions of Americans, millions if not tens of millions 
of American businesses, thousands of American cities, and all states and territo-
ries, it will be critical that the NRDC on the one hand and other cabinet level 
Departments on the other not operate at crossed purposes. It will also be im-
portant not to waste or to overlook the incalculable expertise, and the many col-
laborative relations with other levels and units of government as well as private
sector industries, that these Departments have developed over the decades.
Much as the FSOC acts as a coordinating body among Treasury, Fed, the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and 
other financial regulators, levering their expertise and experience with their “si-
los,” so will the NRDC do in collaboration with its mandate participants.
2. Structure, Governance, Relations with Private Sector and Other Levels & 
Units of Government
There are many ways in which the NRDC might be composed, structured, 
and both internally and externally governed. One attractive prospect is to think 
of the NRDC as a system, by analogy with the Federal Reserve System, and to 
adopt either a three- or a four-tiered structure along the following lines.
2.1. Tier One: The Council Itself
The first option for the top tier would be the heads of the various depart-
ments and other agencies mentioned above, whose fields of expertise and man-
dates overlap with or are adjacent to those of the NRDC itself. This can be 
thought of as a sort of oversight and strategic planning board, comparable to the 
FSOC as noted above and to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.48 It can accordingly be called “the Council,” as the FSOC is called, 
and as the Federal Reserve Board of Governors is called “the Board.”
Ideally, the Council will make decisions in a consensual manner, with vot-
ing conducted pursuant to the majority-rule principle only when consensus 
proves impossible to reach. This, too, would largely replicate FSOC and Fed 
47. A specific proposal along these lines is May et al., Encouraging Inclusive Growth: The 
Employee Equity Loan Act, 62 CHALLENGE 377 (2019), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs
/10.1080/05775132.2019.1668645.
48. See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 1, at 42.
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practice.49 It probably makes sense for the Council to be Chaired by a distinct 
person, appointed by the President for, say, seven-year terms with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. This would follow Fed practice, though the seven-
year terms would of course exceed the four-year terms of Fed Chairs.
An alternative possibility is to make the Treasury Secretary herself the 
Chair, as is done in the case of FSOC.50 The advantage offered by this mode of 
operation is that it subjects the Council to more direct Presidential control. But 
this can also operate as a disadvantage, inasmuch as the investment horizons of 
the NRDC must be long, and accordingly not overly vulnerable to sudden 
changes in politically sensitive Presidential administration.
In the final analysis, because the NRDC will in effect be functionally and 
operationally situated midway between the quite independent Fed and the less 
independent Treasury, it probably makes sense to confer upon it a degree of in-
dependence intermediate between those of the Fed and the Treasury.51 Ap-
pointing a separate Chair for seven-year terms, which is longer than those of 
Treasury Secretaries and Fed Chairs, while shorter than the fourteen-year terms 
of other Fed Board Governors, seems sensible against that backdrop. Changes 
can be legislated in future should seven-year terms come to seem too brief or 
too lengthy.
Similar considerations to those recommending seven-year terms might also 
militate in favor of appointing additional independent members to the Council, 
as a means of lessening the degree of dependence on the White House that the 
present FSOC model entails.52 In the alternative, the Council might be made to 
comprise only independent members appointed by the President for staggered 
seven- or ten-year terms with the advice and consent of the Senate, after the 
manner of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB).  Under this scenario, which we 
can call the second option for the top tier, the other agency and Department 
heads mentioned above—those of the DOT, DOE, DOL, etc.—would be em-
paneled on an Advisory or Coordination Board, with authority only to make 
recommendations to, not actually control, the Council.
In the event that this more independent, FRB-reminiscent governance model 
is adopted, it would make sense to choose Council Governors on the basis of 
criteria analogous to those used in choosing Fed Board Governors. A seven- or 
fourteen-member Council might then be assembled, its members possessed both 
of expertise in the fourteen Green New Deal or National Reconstruction Project 
Fields and past experience in government, industry, the academy, or some com-
bination of these. In essence, the idea would be for the Council’s membership 
49. Id.
50. See HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 42.
51. These differences are rooted in tacit recognition of the modulation/allocation distinction 
noted above, along with an associated judgment that more overtly distributive allocation decisions 
must be subject to proximate political control, while more aspirationally neutral as well as systemi-
cally critical modulation decisions both can and ought to enjoy more discretion.
52. Id.
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to be diversified in a manner mirroring the diversity of the Green New Deal or 
National Reconstruction itself, which as noted will implicate multiple project 
fields, multiple levels of government, and private as well as public sector enti-
ties.
2.2. Tier Two: The Investment Committee or NIC
Whichever option for the NRDC’s top tier we adopt, it will make sense to 
impanel just below it a more operationally focused tier. It would be at this level 
that more detailed planning and execution of project-specific NRDC financing 
is done. We might call this the NRDC Investment Committee, or simply a Na-
tional Investment Council coequal with the NRDC as Wilson’s WFC and Roo-
sevelt’s RFC were coequal with the WIB and WPB, respectively.53 Either way, 
we can think of its role in rough analogy to the Open Market Committee of the 
Fed (FOMC), the finance committee of any large business concern possessed of 
a chief financial officer (CFO), or the investment or fund manager of any in-
vestment bank or investment fund.54
The Investment Committee under this scenario would assess and develop 
multiple financing options for multiple 3B, GND, or NRDC projects or portfo-
lios of such projects, with appropriations, retained earnings or bond sales on the 
income side, and running from grants through loans to bond purchases and equi-
ty investments on the output side.55 It would then present these options to the 
Council for approval or selection, then execute on whatever options the Council 
ultimately opts for.56
The Investment Committee might comprise a simple subcommittee of the 
Council itself, again partly reminiscent of the Fed FOMC model, or might com-
prise mainly or only persons with significant investment management experi-
ence, with the Chair of the Commission itself also serving as Chair, ex officio or 
otherwise, of the Committee.57 Either way, in view of the mainly technical na-
ture of its functions, the Committee members should have, jointly and severally, 
top level financial expertise and experience. For the Committee will, in effect,
be conducting the NRDC’s principal funding and investment operations like 
any finance committee or investment or fund manager.58
One additional layer of possible nuance is worth noting: it might be well to 
subdivide the Investment Committee into two Subcommittees, one concerned 
primarily with direct ‘primary’ market investment, the other concerned with in-
53. Id.
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direct, secondary and tertiary market operations.59 In such case, the Primary 
Market Subcommittee would act much as a contemporary infrastructure bank 
does in underwriting and capital-raising more generally.60 The Secondary Mar-
ket Subcommittee, analogously, would function more like a fund manager in 
purchasing various kinds of securities issued by private and public sector enti-
ties whose investment operations complement the Council’s mandate.61
Needless to say, both Subcommittees would coordinate, as the departments 
of any complex institution do, under the auspices of the Investment Committee 
of which they are part. And the latter Committee, as noted above, would oper-
ate under the continuous oversight of, as a manner of financial agent of, the 
Council.
2.3. Tier Three: Regional NRDC Banks
The third tier of the NRDC System would be a cluster of Regional Banks, 
perhaps roughly patterned after the Fed system of regional Federal Reserve 
Banks. The idea behind this arrangement would be to afford the federal instru-
mentality in question eyes, ears, and operational capacity on the ground in re-
gions of the country whose primary industries and economic conditions differ 
from one another in nontrivial ways.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), for example, has exper-
tise in and jurisdiction over much of the nation’s financial services industry, 
which is of course largely headquartered in New York.  The Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, by contrast, has more expertise in energy and agriculture, in 
keeping with its region’s primary industries. It makes sense for the NRDC to 
operate out of regional locations that are similarly sensitive to regionally vary-
ing economies, financial practices, and both industrial and infrastructure needs.
Indeed, in a number of what he calls “Spread the Fed” proposals, the present 
author has designed Federal Reserve reforms along similar lines, which bring 
the Fed back into closer conformity with its original mandate of 1913, as a sys-
tem of regional development banks.62
The Fed regional structure was developed over a century ago, when the na-
tion’s economy was less financially integrated than it is now, and its regional 
economic profiles were in many ways quite different both from one another and 
from what they have developed into since 1913.63 This presents something of a 
59. See HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 44.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Robert Hockett, Spread the Fed: Distributed Central Banking in Pandemic and Be-
yond, 14 U. VA. L. & BUS. REV. (forthcoming 2020). Robert Hockett, Spread the Fed, Part I, LAW
& POLITICAL ECONOMY (Aug. 12, 2020), https://lpeproject.org/blog/spread-the-fed-part-i/; Robert 
Hockett, Spread the Fed, Part II, LAW & POLITICAL ECONOMY (Aug. 12, 2020), 
https://lpeproject.org/blog/spread-the-fed-part-ii/.
63. See Hockett, Spread the Fed: Distributed Central Banking in Pandemic and Beyond,
supra note 62, at 6–7.
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dilemma where regionally structuring the NRDC’s third tier is concerned.  In 
view of the close coordinating that the NRDC will have to do with the Fed, it 
makes some sense for the NRDC’s regional structure to mirror that of the Fed 
itself. Indeed, in one rendering that this author has proposed elsewhere, the Re-
gional Fed Banks themselves would be restored to their original regional devel-
opment bank mission and thus function as both regional Fed Banks and regional 
NRDC branches.
Because the latter structure has grown anachronistic in light of many chang-
es in regional conditions since 1913, however, to mirror the Fed would be to 
lock in the same now-anachronistic division of regional labor at the NRDC, un-
less we were adding new Regional Feds to the many parts of the country that 
didn’t warrant them back in 1913 but have since come to fill-in and need 
them.64 This would reapportion and supplement the Fed’s regional Reserve 
Banks in keeping with contemporary regional conditions, and then apportion 
NRDC regional functions isomorphically even within these revitalized Regional 
Fed Banks themselves, which were originally meant to be regional development
banks in the first place.
That is effectively what the author’s aforementioned “Spread the Fed” pro-
posal would do, as would his recent “Capital Commons” proposal.65 Short of 
that, the best option will be simply to establish NRDC de novo and distribute 
them as we would wish to do with the Fed Regional Banks under contemporary 
conditions. Then, where these do not coincide with established regional Federal 
Reserve Banks, the NRDC offices could coordinate with local offices of region-
al Fed Reserve Banks.66 These latter exist in relative abundance, as they repre-
sent the Fed’s own response to the regional changes that have unfolded over the 
last century.67
However we decide to structure the NRDC’s regional layer of distinct 
NRDC offices, it probably makes sense for their roles and internal governance 
structures to follow a pattern that either replicates or slightly varies on those of 
their Fed analogues. The ideal arrangement would probably be classified 
boards with one class of directors chosen by the NRDC, another by affected 
state and local governments, and a third by regionally important industries and 
labor organizations—all subject to NRDC veto as in the case of the Fed.
The function of the regional offices would then be to interface with subna-
tional units of government, industry, and labor in their regions for purposes of 
both communication and finance allocation. In this connection, a particularly
important role of the regional NRDC offices will be to work in collaboration 
with the system of public banks that the present author, with sundry state legis-
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quidity and Main Street Lending Facilities to assist with state, local, and small 
business financing needs in the face of the spring 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, 
another such role might be to liaise between regional Federal Reserve Banks on 
the one hand, and states, municipalities, and small businesses aiming to build 
infrastructural, industrial, and smaller scale productive or service-provision ca-
pacity quickly while using the new Facilities on the other hand.68
C. Visual Depiction
The following diagram depicts the components, organizational structure, 
and financial flows associated with the NRDC and its investment arm, along 
with the Fed, Treasury, and private sector entities. Line segments represent 
administrative linkages, while arrows indicate financial flows. “Appropria-
tions” means Congressionally appropriated funds, “remittances” means possible 
remittances to Treasury, “liabs” means financial liabilities (i.e., payment obliga-
tions), and “$” means money payment.
It should be noted that if the division of the Investment Committee into dis-
tinct Primary Market and Secondary Market Subcommittees suggested above is 
adopted, the NRDC Investment Fund depicted in the Diagram will be corre-
spondingly bifurcated. There might, indeed, be multiple funds, according as the 
Committee judges prudent in pursuing multiple public investment avenues or 
strategies. This too would be a structure familiar to contemporary finance, in 
effect constituting a public sector analogue to the family of funds model found 
in the investment company (especially open-end mutual fund) industry.
It should also be noted that I have left the regional branches or offices at 
bottom of the depiction ambiguous as between Regional Federal Reserve Banks 
and regional offices of the NRDC itself. As noted above, I believe the former 
option preferable, and have written extensively why in other work—notably in 
connection with my “Capital Commons” and “Spread the Fed” proposals, which 
68. For more on the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) and the prospect for a form of 
“Community QE” that it opens, see, e.g., Memorandum from Robert Hockett, The Fed’s Municipal 
Liquidity Facility: Present and Future Possibilities and Necessities (May 10, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3597732; Memorandum from Robert Hockett,
Community QE2: New Key Provisions and an Updated ‘Game Plan’ for State and Municipal Action
(Apr. 28, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3589851; Memorandum from 
Robert Hockett, Community QE: Key Provisions and a ‘Game Plan’ for Immediate State Action
(April 12, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3574157. See also Robert 
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would restore the regional Fed Banks to their original purpose as a network of 
FRB-overseen regional development banks. Barring that preferable develop-
ment, however, regional NRDC offices, perhaps housed Regional Fed Banks, 
will have to do.
VISUAL DEPICTION: NRDC ADMINISTRATIVE & FINANCIAL FLOW STRUCTURE
III. CONCLUSION: ORGANIZE AND ORCHESTRATE TO “BUILD BACK BETTER”
National reconstruction and development will likely be high on the legisla-
tive and programmatic agendas of the next President and Congress. Things 
have simply deteriorated for too long, and to far too great an extent, for that not 
to happen. Whether we ultimately call it a Building Back Better, a Green New 
Deal, or a National Reconstruction and Development, action seems inevitable.
That raises the question: ‘what now?’ For the reasons elaborated above, it 
seems clear that matters of organization, and hence of institutional design, will 
have to occupy center stage at the outset of the national rebuilding project. The 
NRDC schematized in this paper seems an optimal mode of organization. On 
one hand, it capitalizes on all the strengths and comparative advantages that our 
existing instrumentalities possess. On the other, it brings coordination and, 
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therefore, mutual operational coherence to their operations. It also, in view both 
of its federated structure and public-private partnering, enables optimal coordi-
nation among all sectors of our economy and society, and all levels of our fed-
eral system of governance.
In short, it is precisely what is needed in order to address the unique coordi-
nation and collective action challenges that face any national development pro-
ject, but no more than that. Hence it is simultaneously “incrementalist” and 
“transformative”—just as we are apt to hope in a nation as young yet tradition-
minded as our own.
What next, then? The answer seems obvious. Next comes the bill that will 
work the rearrangements, which is what the present author is drafting right now.
This need not and ought not discourage similar efforts far and wide. It would 
be not only vain, but insane, for any one author to think they knew all and only 
what the proverbial doctor is ordering. The present contribution should be 
viewed as no more than one of many opening gambits in what is sure to become 
a grand national deliberation ahead.
